We discuss the de…nition of a Bayes factor, the Savage-Dickey result, and develop some inequalities relevant to Bayesian inferences. We consider the implications of these inequalities for the Bayes factor approach to hypothesis assessment. An approach to hypothesis assessment based on the computation of a Bayes factor, a measure of reliability of the Bayes factor, and the point where the Bayes factor is maximized is recommended. This can be seen to deal with many of the issues and controversies associated with hypothesis assessment. It is noted that an inconsistency in prior assignments can arise when priors are placed on hypotheses that do not arise from a parameter of interest. It is recommended that this inconsistency be avoided by choosing a distance measure from the hypothesis as the parameter of interest. An application is made to assessing the goodness of …t for a logistic regression model and it is shown that this leads to resolving some di¢ culties associated with assigning priors for this model.
Introduction
Bayes factors, as introduced by Je¤reys (1935 Je¤reys ( , 1961 , are commonly used in applications of statistics. Kass and Raftery (1995) and Robert, Chopin, and Rousseau (2009) contain detailed discussions of Bayes factors.
Suppose we have a sampling model fP : 2 g on X ; and a prior on : Let T denote a minimal su¢ cient statistic for fP : 2 g and ( j T (x)) denote the posterior of after observing data x 2 X : Then for a set C ; with 0 < (C) < 1; the Bayes factor in favor of C is de…ned by
Clearly BF (C) is a measure of how beliefs in the true value being in C have changed from a priori to a posteriori. Alternatively, we can measure this change in belief by the relative belief ratio of C; namely, RB(C) = (C j T (x))= (C): A relative belief ratio measures change in belief on the probability scale as opposed to the odds scale for the Bayes factor. While a Bayes factor is the multiplicative factor transforming the prior odds after observing the data, a relative belief ratio is the multiplicative factor transforming the prior probability. These measures are related as we have that BF (C) = (1 (C))RB(C) 1 (C)RB(C) ; RB(C) = BF (C) (C)BF (C) + 1 (C) ;
and BF (C) = RB(C)=RB(C c ): If it is hypothesized that 2 H 0 ; then BF (H 0 ) or RB(H 0 ) can be used as an assessment as to what extent the observed data has changed our beliefs in the true value being in H 0 :
Both the Bayes factor and the relative belief ratio are not de…ned when (C) = 0: In Section 2 we will see that, when we have a characteristic of interest = ( ); where : ! (we don't distinguish between the function and its range to save notation), and H 0 = 1 f 0 g with (H 0 ) = 0; we can de…ne the Bayes factor and relative belief ratio of H 0 as limits and that the limiting values are identical. This permits the assessment of a hypothesis H 0 = 1 f 0 g via a Bayes factor without the need for placing prior mass on 0 :
In a number of circumstances there is a set H 0 ; with (H 0 ) = 0; that we want to assess and there is no particular characteristic of interest = ( ) for which H 0 = 1 f 0 g: For example, this arises in the Behrens-Fisher problem and in factor analysis. A common approach here is to use a mixture prior = 0 + (1 ) where 2 (0; 1) and 0 is a prior on H 0 : In Section 3 we point to a general inconsistency in this approach and how this can be resolved. In Section 5 we propose the method of concentration as a general resolution of this problem and address some computational issues. In Section 6 we apply this to obtain a Bayesian goodness-of-…t test for the logistic regression model and show that this leads to priors similar to those recommended by Johnson (1996, 1997) but avoiding an ambiguity in that approach.
One concern with both Bayes factors and relative belief ratios is how they should be calibrated. From (1) we see that, for …xed (C); BF (C) is an increasing function of RB(C) and conversely, so it is somewhat of a personal choice as to which to use to measure change in belief. We will discuss the calibration of these quantities in Section 4 together with some relevant inequalities. Also we establish some close parallels between use of Bayes factors to assess statistical evidence and the approach to assessing statistical evidence via likelihood ratios discussed in Royall (1997 Royall ( , 2000 .
More general de…nitions have been o¤ered for Bayes factors when improper priors are employed. O'Hagan (1995) de…nes fractional Bayes factors and Berger and Perrichi (1996) de…ne intrinsic Bayes factors. In this paper we restrict attention to proper priors although limiting results can often be obtained when considering a sequence of increasingly di¤use priors. Lavine and Schervish (1999) consider the coherency behavior of Bayes factors.
De…nition for a Marginal Parameter
We now extend the de…nition of relative belief ratios and Bayes factors to the case where (H 0 ) = 0: We assume that P has density f with respect to support measure ; has density on with respect to support measure and ( j T (x)) denotes the posterior density on with respect to : Suppose we wish to assess H 0 = 1 f 0 g for some parameter of interest = ( ): We will suppose that all our spaces possess su¢ cient structure, and the various mappings we consider are su¢ ciently smooth, so that the support measures are volume measure on the respective spaces and that any densities used are derived as limits of the ratios of measures of sets converging to points (see, for example, Rudin (1974) , Chapter 8). In particular, whenever a density exists which is continuous at a point this limiting process produces that value for the density and note that this is necessary for the interpretation of continuous probability as an approximation to discrete models, i.e., densities cannot be arbitrarily de…ned at such points. We do not go into further details on this point here except to say that these restrictions are typically satis…ed in statistical problems. The mathematical details can be found in Tjur (1974) , where it is seen that we e¤ectively require Riemann manifold structure for the various spaces considered. For example, these requirements are always satis…ed in the discrete case, as well as in the case of the commonly considered continuous statistical models. One appealing consequence of such restrictions is that we get simple formulas for marginal and conditional densities. For example, putting
where d is the di¤erential of ; and supposing J ( ) is …nite and positive for all ; then the prior probability measure has density, with respect to volume measure on ; given by
where 1 f g is volume measure on 1 f g: Furthermore, the conditional prior density of given ( ) = is
with respect to 1 f g on 1 f g: A signi…cant advantage with (2) and (3) is that there is no need to introduce coordinates, as is commonly done, for so-called nuisance parameters. In general, such coordinates do not exist.
If we let T : X ! T denote a minimal su¢ cient statistic for ff : 2 g; then the density of T; with respect to volume measure T on T ; is given by f T (t) = R
where T 1 ftg denotes volume on T 1 ftg: The prior predictive density, with respect to ; of the full data is given by m(x) = R ( )f (x) (d ) and the prior predictive density of T; with respect to T ; is then m
This leads to a generalization of the Savage-Dickey ratio result, see Dickey and Lientz (1970) , Dickey (1971) , as we don't require coordinates for nuisance parameters.
The posterior density of is ( j T (x)) = ( )f T (T (x))=m T (T (x)); and the posterior density of = ( ); with respect to ; is
) where m T ( j ) is the conditional prior predictive density of T; given ( ) = :
Since ( j T (x))= ( ) is the density of ( j T (x)) with respect to ; we have that
whenever C ( ) converges nicely (see Rudin (1974) for the de…nition of 'nicely') to f g as ! 0 and all densities are continuous at ; e.g., C ( ) could be a ball of radius centered at : So ( j T (x))= ( ) is the limit of the relative belief ratios of sets converging to and, if ( 1 f g) > 0; then ( j T (x))= ( ) gives the previous de…nition of a relative belief ratio for 1 f g: As such we will refer to RB( ) = ( j T (x))= ( ) as the relative belief ratio of : From (4) and (1) we have that
as ! 0 and this equals RB( ) if and only if ( 1 f g) = 0: So, in the continuous case, RB( ) is a limit of Bayes factors with respect to and so can also be called the Bayes factor in favor of with respect to : If, however, ( 1 f g) > 0; then RB( ) is not a Bayes factor with respect to but is related to the Bayes factor through (1). We see that, under general conditions, whenever H 0 = 1 f 0 g we can assess this hypothesis via the relative belief ratio RB( 0 ), that this is a limit of Bayes factor in the continuous case, and is closely related to the Bayes factor generally.
A General Hypothesis
Consider a null hypothesis H 0 and suppose we have not speci…ed a smooth of interest and a value 0 so that and 0 generate H 0 via H 0 = 1 f 0 g: When (H 0 ) > 0; then = I H0 is smooth in the discrete topology on f0; 1g and H 0 = 1 f1g: While there is nothing that forces us to make this choice of ; both the relative belief ratio and Bayes factor of H 0 are, in this case, invariant to the choice of : This is not the case, however, when (H 0 ) = 0; as will happen whenever is dominated by volume measure and H 0 is a lower dimensional subset of : It is then not clear how to compute the relative belief ratio or Bayes factor for H 0 :
The usual approach when (H 0 ) = 0 is to assign a prior probability 0 < < 1 to H 0 and replace by = 0 + (1 ) where 0 is a probability measure on H 0 : Since (H 0 ) = ; we obtain the Bayes factor and relative belief ratio for H 0 with respect to as m 0T (T (x))=m T (T (x)) and fm 0T (T (x))=m T (T (x))g=f1 + m 0T (T (x))=m T (T (x))g; respectively, where
Note that these expressions become equal as ! 0 and that these expressions require (H 0 ) = 0; 0 (H c 0 ) = 0: Now suppose we consider a and 0 that generates H 0 : We then have the following result generalizing Verdinelli and Wasserman (1995) as we don't require coordinates for nuisance parameters. Theorem 2. (Verdinelli-Wasserman) When H 0 = 1 f 0 g for some and 0 and (H 0 ) = 0; then the Bayes factor in favor of H 0 with respect to is
where E 0 refers to expectation with respect to 0 :
the result follows from (3). When 0 = ( j 0 ); then E 0 ( ( j 0 ; T (x))= ( j 0 )) = 1 and (5) establishes that RB( 0 ) is a Bayes factor with respect to : We see from Section 2, however, that we really do not have to introduce the measure to interpret RB( 0 ) as a Bayes factor, as it is a limit of Bayes factors with respect to :
In general (5) establishes the relationship between the Bayes factor when using the conditional prior ( j 0 ) on H 0 and the Bayes factor when using the prior 0 on H 0 : The adjustment is the expected value, with respect to 0 ; of the conditional relative belief ratio ( j 0 ; T (x))= ( j 0 ) for 2 H 0 ; given H 0 : This can also be written as E ( j 0 ;T (x)) ( 0 ( )= ( j 0 )) and so measures the discrepancy between the conditional priors given H 0 under and : So when 0 is substantially di¤erent than ( j 0 ) we can expect a signi…cant difference in the Bayes factors. Clearly, there is an inconsistency in the prior assignments if 0 is not equal to ( j 0 ) for some smooth and 0 :
This inconsistency can also be seen at a fundamental level when we consider how the priors are expressing beliefs about given that H 0 is true. For our conditional relative prior belief for the values 1 ; 2 2 H 0 is given by
( 1 )J ( 1 )= ( 2 )J ( 2 ) when using ( j 0 ) on H 0 and by 0 ( 1 )= 0 ( 2 ) when using 0 on H 0 : Unless these ratios are equal for some there is an inconsistency expressed in our prior beliefs between the priors and : So a natural requirement for any measure 0 is that 0 ( 1 )= 0 ( 2 ) = ( 1 )J ( 1 )= ( 2 )J ( 2 ) for some ; for all 1 ; 2 2 H 0 : When we do this there is no need to introduce the prior as we can proceed via Theorem 1 and treat RB( 0 ) as the relevant Bayes factor and relative belief ratio. If one doubts the need for this consistency requirement, consider the discrete case or the case when we have a of interest, as it seems clear then that choosing a 0 that has no relation to is incorrect.
The question remains, however, which of the many functions that generate H 0 do we use when there is no particular parameter of interest? Note that this problem is similar to the well-known Borel paradox of probability theory, as it is not a well-posed problem, and as such does not have an ultimate solution. It still seems more appropriate, however, to choose a rather than a 0 as, in the former case, we are guaranteed consistency of prior assignments on H 0 : Before proposing a general answer to this question we consider a simple approach that is sometimes available. Suppose is smooth, H 0 = 1 f 0 g and J ( ) is constant and positive for 2 H 0 : We will refer to such a as a constant volume distortion generator of H 0 and denote the class of such transformations by T H0 : We have the following result.
Theorem 3. For every 2 T H0 the conditional relative prior belief of 1 ; 2 2 H 0 is given by ( 1 )= ( 2 ): Furthermore, the relative belief ratio of H 0 is independent of 2 T H0 : Proof: For 1 ; 2 2 H 0 we have that ( 1 )J ( 1 )= ( 2 )J ( 2 ) = ( 1 )= ( 2 ) which proves the …rst part. Also
and since J ( ) is constant inside the integrals, this proves the second statement.
Note that Theorem 3 generalizes the invariance of the Bayes factor and relative belief ratio to found in the discrete case, to the situation (H 0 ) = 0 and 2 T H0 : In essence, when 2 T H0 ; the volume distortions induced by ; as measured by J ( ); do not a¤ect our conditional prior beliefs about 2 H 0 and these are essentially given by the values of ( ) for 2 H 0 : These results provide an argument for basing the computation of a Bayes factor (or relative belief ratio) for H 0 on a 2 T H0 ; when such a transformation is available.
We consider some examples.
Example 1. Point null hypothesis in :
Suppose that H 0 = f 0 g where (H 0 ) = 0: Then the only possible probability measure on H 0 is degenerate at 0 and indeed 0 = ( j 0 ): Therefore, using Theorem 2, we have that the Bayes factors for H 0 under and are the same. Again we note that there is no need to introduce the mixture prior as the Bayes factor f 0T (T (x))=m T (T (x)) arises from as a limit. Also, any smooth transformation on is in T H0 and so Theorem 3 applies.
Example 2. Behrens-Fisher problem.
Suppose that x is a sample from a N ( 1 ; 2 1 ) distribution independent of a sample y from a N ( 2 ; 2 2 ) distribution where ( i ; 2 i ) 2 R R + are unknown for i = 1; 2 and we wish to assess the hypothesis H 0 : 1 = 2 : There are a number of di¤erent possibilities for but perhaps the simplest is = ( 1 ; 2 2 ) = 1= p 2 and so satis…es Theorem 3. There are many other elements of T H0 ; for example, any 1-1 smooth function of is in T H0 ; but they all lead to the same value of the Bayes factor. There are many other transformations that generate
which equals p Example 3. Regression.
Suppose we have y = X + e where X 2 R n k is known and of rank k; 2 R k and > 0 are unknown, e is a sample from a known distribution with mean 0 and variance 1; and we want to assess
be such that (A; B) has rank k and B 0 A = 0: Then H 0 is true if and only if B 0 = 0:
In general T H0 could be empty. To ensure the consistency of prior assignments it is necessary, however, to select a rather than 0 : In Section 5 we discuss a general approach to selecting that has good intuitive support.
Calibration and Inequalities
A Bayes factor or relative belief ratio for H 0 measures how our beliefs in H 0 change after seeing the data. It is relevant to ask, however, how reliable is this evidence? One way to answer this is to propose a scale on which a Bayes factor can be assessed. For example, Kass and Raftery (1995) discuss using a scale due to Je¤reys (1961) . Comparing the Bayes factor to such a scale, however, does not answer a very natural question: how well do the data support alternatives to H 0 ? For example, when H 0 = 1 f 0 g we can consider the Bayes factor for other values of : If a Bayes factor for a 6 = 0 is much larger than that for 0 ; then it seems reasonable to at least express some doubt as to the reliability of the evidence in favour of H 0 : Note that we are proposing to compare RB( 0 ) to each of the possible values of RB( ) as part of assessing H 0 ; as opposed to just considering the hypothesis testing problem H 0 versus H c 0 (see, however, Example 5). This is in agreement with a commonly held view as expressed, for example, in Gelman, Carlin, Stern and Rubin (2004) concerning hypothesis assessment. Note that this is di¤erent than, for example, the discussion in Berger and Delampady (1987) .
We consider …rst measuring the reliability of a relative belief ratio and recall that this is also a Bayes factor in the continuous case. Perhaps the most obvious way to do this is via the tail probability
This is the posterior probability of a value having a relative belief no greater than RB( 0 ): If this probability is small, then there are other values of with greater relative beliefs and the data leads us to assign a large amount of our belief to such values and this certainly should lead to some doubt concerning H 0 : Note that we are not suggesting that a small value of (6) necessarily be interpreted as evidence against H 0 : A small value of (6) does suggest, however, that any evidence in favour of H 0 ; as expressed via RB( 0 ); is not very reliable.
Interpreting the value of a Bayes factor or relative belief ratio without some assessment of the uncertainty does not seem statistically appropriate.
The following simple inequality holds. Theorem 4. The value of (6) is bounded above by RB( 0 ); namely,
Proof:
Of course (7) tells us nothing when RB( 0 ) 1: It does tell us, however, that a very small value of RB( 0 ) is very strong and reliable evidence against H 0 and in fact there is no need to compute (6) in such a situation.
When ( 1 f g) = 0 we can also interpret RB( 0 ) as the Bayes factor with respect to in favour of H 0 and so (6) is also a calibration of the Bayes factor. When has a discrete distribution, we have the following result where we interpret BF ( ) in the obvious way.
the upper bound is …nite and converges to 0 as BF ( 0 ) ! 0: Proof: Using (1) we have that BF ( ) BF ( 0 ) if and only if RB( ) BF ( 0 )=f1+ ( )(BF ( 0 ) 1)g and, as in the proof of Theorem 4, this implies the inequality. Also 1 + ( )(BF ( 0 ) 
So we see that a small value of BF ( 0 ) is, in both the discrete and continuous case, reliable evidence against H 0 :
It is natural to ask if large values of RB( 0 ) and BF ( 0 ) are always reliable evidence in favour of H 0 ? Consider the following example. Example 4. Location normal.
Suppose we have a sample x = (x 1 ; : : : ; x n ) from a N ( ; 1) distribution, where 2 R 1 is unknown, so T (x) = x; we take N (0; 2 ); ( ) = ; and we want to assess H 0 : = 0: In Figure 1 we have plotted RB(0) and (6) against p n x for several cases. From this we can see that, for a given value of p n x; there is a huge discrepancy between the upper bound and (6) as either n or 2 grows. If we accept (6) as the appropriate calibration of the ratio RB(0); then there is clearly a problem with reliably interpreting large values of RB(0) as evidence in support of H 0 :
Based on Je¤reys'scale RB(0) = 20:72 is strong evidence in favour of H 0 ; but when n = 50; 2 = 400; then (6) equals 0:05 and, as such, 20:72 does not seem to be overwhelming evidence in favour of H 0 : The value^ maximizing RB( ); see Figure 2 , is given by^ = 0:28 and RB(^ ) = 141:40: Note that^ = 0:28 cannot be interpreted as being close to 0 independent of the application context. If, however, the application dictates that a value of 0:28 is practically speaking close enough to 0 to be treated as 0, then it certainly seems reasonable to proceed as if H 0 is correct and this is supported by the value of the Bayes factor. In general, it can be shown that for a …xed value of RB(0); then (6) decreases to 0 as either n or 2 grows. Basically this is saying that a higher standard is set for saying a …xed value of RB(0) is evidence in favour of H 0 ; as we increase the amount of data or make the prior more di¤use. So, for example, the more data we have, the larger RB(0) has to be convincing evidence in favour of H 0 : 
So these give the same assessment of reliability. This says that in the binary case BF (H 0 ) < 1 or RB(H 0 ) < 1 is reliable evidence against H 0 only when (H 0 j T (x)) is small. By Corollary 5 and Theorem 4 this will be the case whenever BF (H 0 ) or RB(H 0 ) are suitably small. Furthermore, large values of BF (H 0 ) or RB(H 0 ) are always deemed to be reliable evidence in favour of H 0 in this case. Note that
are the prior predictive densities of T under H 0 and H c 0 ; respectively. So if one has determined in an application that comparing H 0 to H c 0 is the appropriate approach, as opposed to comparing the hypothesized value of the parameter of interest to each of its alternative values, then (6) leads to the usual answers. We might refer to this as hypothesis testing as opposed to hypothesis assessment. We advocate hypothesis assessment, however, particularly as it allows us to avoid the inconsistency in prior assignments discussed in Section 3.
Using Theorem 1 we can express Theorem 4 as follows.
can be interpreted as the relative belief in the value T (x) from a priori to a priori ( j 0 ): We also have a coarser bound on (6). Corollary 7.
(
and the result follows by Theorem 1. We see that sup 2 1 f 0g f T (t)=m T (T (x)) is a standardized pro…le likelihood at 0 ; i.e., it cannot be multiplied by a positive constant. So the pro…le likelihood has an evidential interpretation as part of an upper bound on (6). The proof of Theorem 1 shows
is a standardized integrated likelihood at 0 and it gives a sharper bound on (6). This can be interpreted as saying the integrated likelihood contains more relevant information concerning H 0 than the pro…le likelihood. This provides support for the use of integrated likelihoods over pro…le likelihoods as discussed in Berger, Liseo, and Wolpert (1999) . If we simply treat RB( ) as an integrated likelihood, however, then we lose the interpretation of the ratio as a relative belief and we lose (7). Now suppose we follow Royall (2000) and consider the prior probability of getting a small value of RB( 0 ) when H 0 is true, as we know from (7) that this would be misleading evidence. We have the following result. Theorem 8. The prior probability that RB( 0 ) 1=k; given that H 0 is true, is bounded above by 1=k: Proof: We have that
Theorem 8 tells us that, a priori, the relative belief ratio for H 0 is unlikely to be small when H 0 is true. The probability in Theorem 8 equals
We can interpret the left-hand side of the inequality as a frequentist tail probability for assessing H 0 : If we consider ( j 0 ) and x P ; then the left-hand side is the prior probability, when H 0 is true, of obtaining data that would lead to a relative belief ratio no greater than that observed. On the other hand (6) is a Bayesian calibration of RB( 0 ): We see that the ratio RB( 0 ) provides an upper bound on both of these tail probabilities and so a small value of RB( 0 ) leads to evidence against H 0 from both points of view. A similar conclusion holds for the upper bound sup 2 1 f 0g f T (t)=m T (T (x)):
Theorem 8 is concerned with RB( 0 ) providing misleading information when H 0 is true. Naturally, we are also concerned with the prior probability that RB( ) is large when H 0 is false, namely, when = ( ) 6 = 0 : For this we consider the behavior of the ratio RB( ) when is a false value, as discussed in Evans and Shakhatreh (2008) , namely, we calculate the prior probability that RB( ) k when ( j 0 ); x P and independently of ( ; x): So is a false value in the generalized sense that it has no connection with the true value of the parameter and the data. We have the following result.
Theorem 10. The prior probability that RB( ) k; when ( j 0 ); x P and independently of ( ; x); is bounded above by 1=k: Proof: We have that
So Theorem 10 says that it is a priori very unlikely that RB( ) will be large when is a false value, given that the true value is 0 : Putting k = RB( 0 ) gives the following result.
So a large value of RB( 0 ) says there is little prior probability, when H 0 is true, of obtaining a larger value at another value of and this can be interpreted as evidence of support for H 0 : Just as the results in Royall (2000) support the evidential use of likelihood ratios, Corollaries 9 and 11 support the evidential use of relative belief ratios and Bayes factors, where small values of these quantities are evidence against H 0 and large values are evidence in favor of H 0 : But note that both of these results are a priori calculations given that H 0 holds. From fundamental considerations it is more appropriate that such assessments be a posteriori and moreover that alternatives to H 0 be considered. This is the role ful…lled by (6). Very small values of RB( 0 ) can be interpreted somewhat de…nitively as evidence against H 0 although, even in this case, we might want to see where most of the relative belief is being assigned via computing^ = arg sup RB( ) to see if this represents a deviation from H 0 of practical signi…cance. Large values of RB( 0 ) almost certainly need to be quali…ed by (6) and by looking at (^ ; RB(^ )): It seems that the assessment of a hypothesis is a somewhat subtle process that involves more than the computation of a single number, whether that be a Bayes factor or a tail probability.
We stress that (6) should not be interpreted as a P-value. For example, suppose RB( 0 ) = 20 and (6) equals 0:50: While RB( 0 ) suggests strong evidence in favour of H 0 ; the reliability of that evidence does not seem overwhelming. If (6) equaled 0:05; then the evidence in favour of H 0 doesn't seem at all reliable, while if (6) equaled 0:95; then the reliability of the evidence in favour of H 0 seems very strong. In all cases we recommend also reporting (^ ; RB(^ )) as this is telling us where the data has increased belief the most, by what factor, and allows the issue of practical signi…cance to be addressed.
While (6) is not a P-value it has some of the properties of a P-value when we consider its behaviour as a function of the data. For example, as we increase the amount of data then, under conditions, (6) converges to 0 when H 0 is false and converges to a uniformly distributed random variable when H 0 is true. Recall, however, that our interpretation of (6) in an application is a posteriori, namely, given the data. It is also worth remarking, as noted in Evans (1997) , that, in the context of Example 4, Lindley's paradox is resolved as the limit of (6) as 2 ! 1 is equal to the P-value for the two-sided Z-text. Vlachos and Gelfand (2003) and Garcia-Donato and Chen (2005) also propose a method for calibrating Bayes factors in the binary case, as discussed in Example 5, but their calibration involves tail probabilities based on the prior predictive distributions given by m H0 and m H c 0 : So their calibration is in the spirit of Corollary 9. The calibration based on (6) is, however, a posteriori and this is in accord with the axiom of conditional probability that says that all probability statements about unknown parameters should be conditional given the data.
Method of Concentration
We now consider the selection of a function when we are asked to assess H 0 that doesn't arise from a parameter of interest. In the Examples of Section 3 we gave some simple choices but such simplicity is not always available. We base the selection of a function for a general problem on the following idea. If H 0 is true, then we expect the observed data to lead to the posterior distribution of being more concentrated about H 0 than the prior distribution of : To measure the concentration of a distribution about H 0 we choose a measure of the distance d H0 ( ) of from H 0 ; such that d H0 ( ) = 0 if and only if 2 H 0 ; and then see how closely the distribution of d H0 ( ) concentrates about 0. Note that ( ) = d H0 ( ) generates H 0 via H 0 = 1 f0g: Often we can choose d H0 so that 2 T H0 although we don't regard this as essential. The following example considers a natural choice.
Example 6. Squared Euclidean distance.
Suppose is an open subset of R k and let d H0 ( ) = jj 0 ( )jj 2 where 0 ( ) is a point in H 0 that is closest to : For example, suppose H 0 is a linear subspace, namely, H 0 = L(X) for some X 2 R k l of rank l:
so has constant volume distortion for each value of : Obviously this generalizes to a¢ ne subspaces of R k : Now suppose H 0 = f : t = 1g; i.e., H 0 is the unit sphere and ( ) = jj 0 ( )jj 2 : Then 0 ( ) = =jj jj and ( ) = jj 0 ( )jj 2 = jj jj 2 (1 1=jj jj) 2 = (jj jj 1) 2 and so d ( ) = 4(jj jj 1) t =jj jj giving J ( ) = 4jjj jj 1j = 4 1=2 ( ): Again has constant volume distortion at each value of : We can easily generalize this to spheres with an arbitrary radius and center. Also we can generalize to ellipsoids by …rst reparameterizing so that the ellipsoid is a sphere in the new parameterization.
While there is nothing that forces us to choose d H0 to be squared Euclidean distance, this choice often has some computational convenience and can be considered as a generalization of the use of variance in statistics as a measure of spread. As such it has intuitive appeal but we certainly do not rule out other choices. This re ‡ects a certain arbitrariness in problems where we have not speci…ed a parameter of interest, but we recall our discussion of Section 3 where we noted that consistency of prior beliefs requires that such a choice be made.
Given that we have chosen d H0 ; the question remains as to how we should compare the concentrations of the prior and posterior about H 0 : In Evans, Gilula, and Guttman (1993) and Evans, Gilula, Guttman, and Swartz (1997) d H0 was taken to be squared Euclidean distance and the prior and posterior distributions of were compared graphically. A more formal method would compute a Bayes factor and assess the reliability of the Bayes factor via (6) with ( ) = jj 0 ( )jj 2 : There is a problem with this, however, as in Example 6 we have J ( ) 0 when 2 H 0 and as such we cannot use (0 j T (x))= (0) to de…ne RB(0): The following example illustrates this and how to resolve the problem.
Example 7. Squared Euclidean distance (continued).
Suppose that is an open subset of R 1 and H 0 = f 0 g. Now for each > 0 we have that 1 f g is counting measure on 1 f g = f 0 1=2 ; 0 + 1=2 g:
Accordingly, we have that
as the limit equals ( 0 j T (x))= ( 0 ); namely, the Bayes factor in favor of H 0 : This result can be easily generalized to higher dimensions with 1 f g equal to surface area on the sphere of radius 1=2 : To see a speci…c case, suppose that we are sampling from a N k ( ; I) distribution, with the prior given by N k (0; I); and we want to assess H 0 : = 0 using the distance measure ( ) = 0 : The prior distribution of is then chi-squared(k; 0); and if we observe the value x based on a sample of n; the posterior distribution is (n + 1) 1 chi-squared(k; n 2 x 0 x=(n + 1)): Note that both densities vanish at 0. As k increases the order of this zero increases because the surface area of a sphere of radius 1=2 in R k is proportional to (k 1)=2 : In spite of this RB(0) = (n + 1) k=2 expf n 2 x 0 x=(n + 1)g via (7). This shows that the need to evaluate RB(0) via (8) does not arise because the prior is assigning little prior probability to H 0 but rather is due to the geometry associated with :
In general we de…ne RB(0) by (8). We note that this agrees with the de…nition given previously when (0) > 0 and (0 j T (x)) > 0 but extends it to the case where both are 0.
A computational di¢ culty also arises when (0) = 0 and (0 j T (x)) = 0 as we will approximate RB(0) by RB( ) for near 0 and this requires accurate estimates of ( ) and ( j x): Since we will commonly use simulation methods, the fact that the prior and posterior densities vanish at 0 indicates there will not be many sampled values of near 0 from either the prior or posterior. We note, however, that, whenever is in the left tail of the prior, then ( RB( ) RB( ) j T (x)) is a measure of the concentration of the posterior relative to the prior about H 0 : So our approach is to choose to be a left tail quantile of that can be reliably estimated, e.g., the 0:05 quantile, and then use ( RB( ) RB( ) j T (x)) to approximate (6). Actually, rather than relying on a single number, it makes sense to look at (RB( ) RB( ) j x) for several choices of in the left tail of the prior, to determine how the posterior distribution of has concentrated about 0 relative to its prior distribution.
We use the following algorithm for the approximations. This requires that we have available exact or approximate samplers for both and ( j T (x)): Let N be a positive integer and i=N denote the i=N -th prior quantile of for i = 0; : : : ; N where 0 = 0 and 1 = 1: Also, letF denote an empirical prior cdf,F ( j x) denote an empirical posterior cdf, = i0=N and i 0 2 f1; : : : ; N g:
(1) Select M 1 and generate a sample 1 ; : : : ; M1 from : (2) Compute the estimates^ 0 ;^ 1=N ;^ 2=N ; : : : ;^ 1 ; using interpolation between sample quantiles, where^ 0 = 0 and^ 1 is the largest sample value. (3) Select M 2 and generate a sample 1;x ; : : : ; M2;x from ( j T (x)):
The following result, which is proved in the Appendix, establishes the convergence of (9) to (6) as N; M 1 ; and M 2 grow.
Theorem 12. Suppose that RB( ) is continuous in and RB( ) has a continuous posterior distribution. Then (9) converges almost surely to to (RB( ) RB(0) j x) as N ! 1; M 1 ! 1 and M 2 ! 1:
Logistic Regression
We consider a Bayesian analysis of the logistic regression model. For simplicity we will discuss the case of a single predictor but note that adding more predictors is completely feasible. We develop a test for goodness of …t based on the method of concentration and show that this leads to a method for assigning a prior on model parameters that avoids problems with more typical choices.
Let x i 2 R 1 denote the value of a predictor X; p i = P (Y = 1 j X = x i ) and i = ln p i =(1 p i ): Suppose …rst that X is a categorical predictor taking k values and we observe n i observations when X = x i : If we assume the observations are independent, which is primarily a matter of how we sampled, then the appropriate model is a k-fold product of binomial models. Depending on what we know a priori, we could select independent beta priors for the p i ; although other choices are certainly possible. For example, if we felt that we know virtually nothing about p i ; then we could take p i to be uniformly distributed and note this implies that the prior distribution of i is standard logistic via the transformation p i = expf i g=(1 + expf i g): In this case it is relatively simple to assign a prior to the p i or i and, in particular, assign one that is noninformative.
Suppose now that X is quantitative. In this situation it is common to relate the p i to X via i = 1 + 2 x i or use a higher degree polynomial. Interest then is in making inference about the i and in particular assess H 0 : 2 = 0: It is common to put something like N (0; are chosen large to re ‡ect little information a priori. As is well-known, see for example Evans and Jang (2011a) , there are problems with such a choice and this is illustrated in Figure 3 where we have plotted the prior density of p when 1 ; 2 N (0;
2 ); x = 1 and = 20: As grows all the prior probability for p piles up at 0 and 1 and so this is clearly a poor choice. For a general (p 1 ; : : : ; p k ) it is not clear how we should choose a normal prior on ( 1 ; 2 ) to re ‡ect the information about the p i : The strange behavior of such priors has been noted by other authors. Johnson (1996, 1997) , based on earlier work in Tsutukawa and Lin (1986) , make the sensible recommendation that priors should instead be placed on the p i ; as these are the parameters for which we typically have prior information. Their recommendation is that, when i = 1 + 2 x i ; two of the x i values be selected and then Beta( i ; i ) priors be placed on the corresponding p i : While this results in more sensible priors, it su¤ers from the need to select the two x i values as the induced prior on the i will depend on this choice.
There is another issue that arises for the model with i = 1 + 2 x i : Such a relationship holding for the k distinct observed values of X imposes a restriction on ( 1 ; : : : ; k ) that does not apply in the case when X is categorical. As such it is necessary to ask, before we make inferences about the i ; if indeed such a relationship holds. Suppose then that we have no information about the relationship between Y and X other than that the y i are conditionally independent given the x i : In such a case it seems reasonable to assume that the p i are i.i.d. U (0; 1): This implies that a posteriori p 1 ; : : : ; p k are independent with p i Beta(1 + n i y i ; 1 + n i (1 y i )); where y i denotes the proportion of successes observed when X = x i : If indeed we do have prior information about some or all of the p i ; then other beta distributions can be used for the priors.
We can now assess the logistic regression hypothesis using the method of concentration via generating from the prior and posterior distributions of the p i and transforming to i = ln p i =(1 p i ): For if 2 R k is the vector of logodds, then the logistic regression model holding is equivalent to 2 H 0 = L(V ) where V = (1 k ; x); 1 k = (1; : : : ; 1) t 2 R k and x = (x 1 ; : : : ; x k ) t : Using Euclidean distance, which seems like a natural choice in this case, the method of concentration compares the prior and posterior distributions of
Consider an example.
Example 8. Checking the logistic regression model. First we apply the goodness-of-…t test when the model is correct. For this consider the case k = 3; x 1 = 0; x 2 = 1; x 3 = 2 and 1 = 0:5; 2 = 1 so p = (0:62; 0:38; 0:18): We generated data from the model, for varying common values of n i : In Table 1 we present the generated values of the n y i ; and the values of ( RB( ) RB( ) j T (x)) for various left-tail prior quantiles of the prior together with the corresponding value of RB( ): In Figure 4 we have plotted the posterior density of and RB( ) with the 0:05; 0:10; 0:20 and 0:50 prior quantiles marked on the x-axis. We see that in each case the posterior distribution of the distance measure has concentrated in the left tail of the prior distribution of the distance measure and so we have no evidence against the model. We also consider an example where the simple logistic regression model is wrong. Let k = 5 with x = (1; 3; 5; 7; 9) and p = (0:875; 0:327; 0:107; 0:198; 0:908) so the relationship i = 1 + 2 x i does not hold for any choice of ( 1 ; 2 ). In Table 2 we present the results for generated data from the model with these probabilities, and in Figure 5 we plot the prior and posterior densities of and RB( ): We see that there is clear evidence that the model does not hold.
This test of …t has low power when many of n i are small. In design contexts we can select the values (x i ; n i ) to ensure sensitivity. In many situations, however, the data have many n i = 1: In these circumstances we can typically group the x i values and also …t higher order quadratic or cubic terms, and test for the higher order terms for the model checking. We illustrate this in Example 10.
0.01 0.05 0.10 n i = 1 n i = 5 n i = 10 (1; 0; 0) (3; 2; 1) (7; 4; 2) 0.828 (1.059) 1.000 (2.073) 1.000 (2.714) 0.702 (1.048) 0.979 (2.067) 0.841 (2.611) 0.670 (1.046) 0.856 (2.011) 0.763 (2.567) (8) Suppose that we obtain no evidence against the logistic regression model holding. Then appropriate inferences for the i are obtained using the conditional prior and posterior of given that 2 H 0 = L(V ): Since J d H 0 (0) = 0 we cannot use (3) to obtain the conditional prior density but we can proceed as follows. Let V ? 2 R k (k 2) be such that its columns are an orthonormal basis of
; then J ( ) 1 from which we conclude that 2 T H0 with H 0 = 1 f0g: Let denote the prior on with density ; and H0 denote volume measure on H 0 : Then by (3), ( )= R H0 ( ) H0 (d ) is the conditional prior density of given that ( ) = 0: Now let C = f : d H0 ( ) < g and and note that C shrinks to H 0 as # 0: Let A H 0 and put A = f : 0 ( ) 2 Ag \ C so A shrinks to A as # 0: Then it is easy to show that
is the conditional prior density of given that d H0 ( ) = 0: Accordingly, when using a product of uniform priors on the p i ; the conditional prior density of ; given H 0 ;is proportional to
If we coordinatize H 0 by ( 1 ; 2 ); then the conditional prior of ( 1 ; 2 ) is proportional to
A similar result holds for the conditional posterior. If we choose to put informative beta priors on some of the p i ; then it is still easy to determine the form of the conditional prior on
Still it is somewhat di¢ cult to see exactly what these priors are saying about the i and it is also di¢ cult to see how to take into account the fact that, when two x i values are close, then the p i should be highly correlated. A well-known N (0; d 2 ) approximation to the standard logistic distribution, as discussed in Camilli (1994) , leads to conditional priors that are much easier to work with. The optimal choice of d; in the sense that it minimizes max x2R 1 j (x=d) e x =(1 + e x )j is given by d = 1:702 and this leads to a maximum di¤erence less than 0:01: Clearly this error will generally be irrelevant when considering priors for the probabilities in a logistic regression problem. So when is distributed N (0; 1:702 2 ) we have that e =(1 + e ) is approximately distributed U (0; 1) with the same maximum error. In Figure 6 we have plotted the density of p = e =(1 + e ) when is N (0; d 2 ) for various choices of d and we see that it is indeed approximately uniform when d = 1:702: The prior
on the logits by the uniform prior on (p 1 ; : : : ; p k ) is then approximated by the N k (0; d 2 I) prior with d = 1:702. Now suppose that we condition on = V where V 2 R k 2 and V 0 V = I; namely, V is column orthonormal. The conditional prior on is proportional to expf 0 V 0 V =2d 2 g = expf 0 =2d 2 g; namely, the conditional prior on is N 2 (0; d 2 I): Note that this says that the i are independent and approximately distributed standard logistic. Then, applying the standard logistic cdf F componentwise, we have that
distribution is singular but we can generate a value from it easily via u = dV z where z N 2 (0; I): From this we can simulate to obtain the conditional joint prior on p: We consider an example. Example 9. Equispaced points Suppose x i = a + (i 1)h for i = 1; : : : ; k: We then have that
and Figure 6) . When k = 100 the smallest standard deviation is 0:10d = 0:17 and the largest is 0:20d = 0:34: So we see that variances are more extreme the farther we move away from the center and correlations are high and positive when the points are close together becoming negative when points are far apart. Given that F is a strictly increasing function these statements also apply to the p i values.
Several questions remain to be addressed. The prior
2 on the logits makes sense when we know absolutely nothing about the p i : In situations where we feel we know something about p i ; e.g., we know that p i is very small, it makes more sense to place a prior on p i that re ‡ects this. One could then choose location and scaling parameters for the logistic distribution to re ‡ect to what our knowledge about p i says about i : Again we can approximate such a distribution by a normal distribution as it is easier to work with. Furthermore, given that we have available a predictor variable, it seems desirable that the prior we use re ‡ect the fact that we know that when jx i x j j is small then jp i p j j is small too. This is accomplished by imposing a correlation between i and j that depends upon jx i x j j: In the end we wind up choosing a N k ( ; ) prior on : Then the conditional prior on is
and p = F (u) with
So we choose ( i ; ii ) to re ‡ect what we know about
where z N (0; 1): For example, if we think that p i is in the interval (0:1; 0:2) with prior probability 0:9 then 0:9
) and placing another prior probability restriction on p i will allow us to solve for i and ii : Choosing ( i ; ii ) = (0; d 2 ) corresponds to being noninformative about p i : The issue of correlations is more di¢ cult but a plausible approach here is to take Corr( i ; j ) = expf (x i x j ) 2 =2l 2 g where l 0 is a hyperparameter chosen to re ‡ect how quickly we believe p i and p j will become alike as jx i x j j ! 0: Note that if we take l = 0; then the p i are a priori uncorrelated and when l = 1; then the p i are completely dependent. The choice of l re ‡ects what we know about the dependence of the probabilities on the predictor. Perhaps a natural approach to choosing l is to select ( i ; j ) and then choose l so that Corr( i ; j ) equals some speci…c value. Alternatively, we could consider placing a prior on l: Note that, when x i ! x j ; then the N k ( ; ) prior converges to the N k 1 ( i ; i ) distribution where ( i ; i ) is obtained from ( ; ) by deleting all entries associated with the i-th coordinate. So there is a coherency among priors between the situations where we consider i and j as possibly very di¤erent, because jx i x j j is large, and when we think of them as virtually identical because jx i x j j is quite small. Of course 'large' and 'small' are application dependent as this depends on the meaning of the predictor.
We now consider a real data application of this to a quadratic logistic regression model. Example 10. Gender-Height data.
We consider predicting gender from height (Ht) measurements in cm from a data set on 102 male and 100 female athletes collected by the Australian Institute of Sport. There are 147 distinct values of Ht and we grouped these to form 21 cells each of length 3 cm ranging from 147 cm to 211 cm. The value of the predictor variable was taken to be the midpoint of each interval. This was done to reduce the size of the correlation matrix and it is felt that little was lost in describing the relationship. The raw data can be found in Sheather (2008) .
We considered the model logit(p) = 1 + 2 Ht + 3 (Ht) 2 : For the prior on the 21 distinct i we chose a N 21 (0; d 2 R) distribution with l = 2 so that the correlation between the i in adjacent cells equals 0:32: In Figure 7 we have plotted the prior density, posterior density and the relative belief ratio of the squared distance for the goodness of …t test. We can see from this that there is evidence in favour of the logistic model. In fact the goodness-of-…t test for the For the hypothesis H 0 : 3 = 0 we obtained RB(0) = 2:99 with (6) equal to 0:59 and (^ 3 ; RB(^ 3 )) = (0:72; 3:47) so this is evidence in favour of 3 = 0: For the hypothesis H 0 : 2 = 0 we obtained RB(0) = 1:6 10 11 which we know by Theorem 4 immediately provides strong evidence against H 0 :
Conclusions
We have shown that, when a hypothesis H 0 has 0 prior probability with respect to a prior on ; a Bayes factor and a relative belief ratio of H 0 can be sensibly de…ned without the need to introduce a discrete mass on H 0 : Furthermore, we have developed a resolution of an inconsistency in Bayesian analyses that arises when a prior is used within H 0 that is not induced from the prior on the whole parameter space. When H 0 is generated by a parameter of interest, this inconsistency is easily avoided by using the conditional prior given H 0 : When a problem is ill-speci…ed, namely, we don't specify a parameter of interest, then we need to select one that generates H 0 to avoid this inconsistency. A natural approach in this situation is use a distance measure from H 0 as the parameter of interest, as this is seen to be equivalent to comparing the concentration of the posterior about H 0 with the concentration of the prior about H 0 : This was applied to obtaining a Bayesian goodness of …t test for the logistic regression model and in turn this was used to obtain a prior on the regression coe¢ cients that was induced from a prior on the success probabilities. This approach is seen to avoid problems associated with attempting to place priors directly on regression coe¢ cients.
In general, we have argued that computing a Bayes factor, a measure of the reliability of the Bayes factor via a posterior tail probability, and the point where the Bayes factor is maximized together with its Bayes factor, provides a logical, consistent approach to hypothesis assessment. Various inequalities were derived that support the use of the Bayes factor in assessing either evidence in favour or against a hypothesis. The capacity to provide evidence either for or against a hypothesis is a signi…cant advantage of the Bayesian approach to hypothesis assessment.
We note further that Evans and Shakhatreh (2008) establishes various optimal properties for credible regions and associated tests derived from (6). Evans and Jang (2011b) proves that^ ; the point maximizing RB( ); has optimal decision-theoretic properties, namely, it is either a Bayes rule or a limit of Bayes rules. (A N j x)j < =3 for all N > N 0 : By part (ii) of the Lemma there exits N 00 such that for all N > N 00 we have that (B N j x) < =6: Hereafter we suppose that N > maxfN 0 ; N 00 g: We now prove that for all M 1 and M 2 large enough, (1) is within of (RB( ) RB(0) j x): Let S N = fi : N (F ( (i+1)=N j x) F ( i=N j x)) < N F ( 1=N j x)g and note that (A N j x) = P i2S N (F ( (i+1)=N j x) F ( i=N j x)): By Theorem 2.3.1 of Ser ‡ing (1980) we have that^ i=N ! i=N almost surely as M 1 ! 1 and M 2 ! 1: Also, by the Glivenko-Cantelli theorem, we have thatF ( ) converges almost surely and uniformly to F ( ) and similarlyF ( j x) converges to F ( j x) as M 1 ! 1 and M 2 ! 1: In particular, this implies that RB(0) converges almost surely to N F ( 1=N j x):
Suppose i 2 S N : Let = N F ( 1=N j x) N (F ( (i+1)=N j x) F ( i=N j x)):
Then, for all M 1 ; M 2 large enough,RB(0) > N F ( 1=N j x) =2 and
This implies that i 2Ŝ N = fi :RB(^ i=N ) R B(0)g for all M 1 ; M 2 large enough and so S N Ŝ N for all M 1 ; M 2 large enough. Furthermore, the contribution (F (^ (i+1)=N j x) F (^ i=N j x)) that this index makes to the sum (1) converges to (F ( (i+1)=N j x) F ( i=N j x)) as M 1 ! 1 and M 2 ! 1:
If i = 2 S N and N (F ( (i+1)=N j x) F ( i=N j x)) > N F ( 1=N j x) ; then the same argument shows that i = 2Ŝ N for all M 1 ; M 2 large enough. Since #(Ŝ N ) N; then for for all M 1 ; M 2 large enough, we have that P (^ i=N j x) ) where the second sum contains at most those terms corresponding to i where N (F ( (i+1)=N j x) F ( (i+1)=N j x)) = N F ( 1=N j x): The …rst sum converges almost surely to (A N j x) and the limit supremum of the second term is bounded above by P D(N;x) (F ( (i+1)=N j x) F ( i=N j x)) = (B N j x) where D(N; x) = fi : N (F ( (i+1)=N j x) F ( i=N j x)) = N F ( 1=N j x)g: So for all M 1 ; M 2 large enough we have j P i2S N (F (^ (i+1)=N j x) F (^ i=N j x)) (A N j x)j < =3 and P i2Ŝ N nS N (F (^ (i+1)=N j x) F (^ i=N j x)) < =3 and this …nishes the proof. The proof of the more general case, where i 0 is not constrained to be 1, follows easily by noting that i0=N ! 0 as N ! 1:
